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Personality in PDM-2: Controversial Issues
Nancy McWilliams, Brin F.S. Grenyer, and Jonathan Shedler

Abstract
The Adult Personality section of the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual, 2nd Ed (PDM-2)
(Lingiardi & McWilliams, 2017) reflects the best effort of theorists, researchers, and
clinicians to capture clinically relevant personality constellations, from healthy
personality styles to highly troubled disorders. We specify some foundational
assumptions impelling this work, especially as they differ from those underlying
categorical, descriptive psychiatric taxonomies such as the DSM and ICD. We describe
and give the rationale for changes from PDM-1 to PDM-2, call attention to ongoing
controversies and our efforts to resolve or represent them in PDM-2, and note the
importance of future research on personality.
Keywords: Personality, diagnosis, assessment, Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual,
Clinical Utility
We are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the Adult Personality section—the P
Axis—of the second edition of the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM-2; 2017). In this
essay, we focus on issues involving personality and its formulation that have been sources of
controversy in the mental health field, issues with which we grappled when revising the P Axis
of the manual. First, we make explicit our basic premises, assumptions about personality which
seem self-evidently reasonable to us but which are not necessarily reflected in other taxonomies.
We then explore some differences between the Adult Personality sections of the first (PDM Task

Force, 2006) and second (Lingiardi & McWilliams, 2017) editions, and give the rationale for
some of the changes made in the 2017 manual. Finally, we describe some disagreements and
uncertainties that arose either among ourselves or among other contributors, most of which
represent general controversies in the field of personality.
Guiding Assumptions
There were several basic premises underlying our delineation of personality in the adult
section of PDM-2. First, we assume that everyone has a personality style—a relatively stable
confluence of temperament, attachment style, developmental concerns, defenses, affect patterns,
motivational tendencies, cultural influences, gender and sexual expressions and other factors—
irrespective of whether that personality style can be reasonably conceptualized as “disordered.”
We believe that understanding an individual’s personality structure is useful for treatment
planning, irrespective of whether or not the personality itself is problematic or the direct focus of
treatment. We emphasize in PDM-2 that all efforts to be either comprehensive or reductive about
varieties of individuality are oversimplifications of a more complicated reality. Still, we believe
that some degree of generalization about personality style or type and level of health versus
dysfunction of different personality configurations is clinically useful.
Second, while we relied heavily on the findings of empirical researchers, we gave
significant weight to accumulated clinical experience and a wide range of scientific
investigations of issues relevant to personality and psychopathology (Hirschfeld, 1991). In
contemporary academic psychology, it is common to devalue practitioner observations; in fact,
some researchers want to confer the designation “evidence” only on randomized controlled trials
of manualized treatments (for a discussion see Shedler, 2017). However, there are many types of
scientific evidence that bear on clinical issues (e.g., empirical investigations into personality,

attachment, defense, development, affect, neuroscience). A strength of the PDM-2 is its effort to
synthesize psychodynamic observations of mental functioning with additional understandings
deriving from empirical studies of personality, neuroscience, and psychotherapy.
We should emphasize that many psychological conditions have not been well researched,
mostly because such investigations would be particularly difficult or unethical. But they have
inspired a thoughtful clinical literature that practitioners have found illuminating and clinically
valuable. Notably, this writing includes in-depth commentary on clinicians’ emotional
experiences of working with different kinds of patients. Whereas academic critics tend to view
the subjective aspects of the clinical role as contaminations of “objective” data, seasoned
clinicians consistently describe relying on inference, deduction, and a disciplined subjectivity to
comprehend many psychological phenomena that are not easily captured by objective measures.
In PDM-2, as in PDM-1, in addition to including information from empirical studies of all kinds,
we paid attention to the vast body of accreted clinical knowledge, including practitioners’
descriptions of their subjective reactions to various clinical presentations.
In other words, in PDM-2, we have given the clinical literature the respect we think it
deserves. This perspective is in notable contrast to the DSM, which excluded some clinically
recognized personality disorders on the basis of the paucity of empirical research on them.
However, people with sadistic or counterdependent personalities, for example, are living in our
communities even if research funding to study them is hard to come by, and even if they are not
coming for mental health treatment and thus remain harder to reach. The PDM-2 provides
clinicians with the opportunity to think about these presentations, based on what has been known
and developed in the clinical literature over the past 120 years.

Third, on the basis of both empirical research (American-Psychological-Association,
2012; Lambert, 2013) and reports by generations of seasoned clinicians, we think it is clear that
for the majority of adults in psychotherapy, personality has vastly more relevance to outcome
than the diagnostic categories of descriptive psychiatry, and that most clinicians have recognized
this for a long time. Thus, except for certain specific clinical situations (e.g., ongoing acute
trauma, toxic psychoses, crises of addiction), most practitioners begin a psychological evaluation
by trying to understand the meaning and function of patients’ difficulties in the larger context of
their personality dynamics (McWilliams, 2011).
A constellation of symptoms may have different meanings in people of differing
psychological make-up, much as a limp or fever or skin rash may connote different health
problems depending on the circumstances. Even in medicine, “disorder” categories are not
grouped by their externally observable symptoms (“limp disorders,” “fever disorders,” etc.) but
by the pathophysiology underlying them (von Linné, 1964). Consequently, we support the
conclusions drawn by most practitioners that any disorder makes sense only in the context of a
person’s personality and circumstances, and that approaches to symptomatic treatment should
differ based on an understanding of the person suffering the symptoms (Grenyer, 2002). The
decision to put the personality chapter first in the adult section reflects these clinical realities.
Fourth, we assume that the understanding of personality requires appreciation of both
personality style and personality level of organization. Therapeutic experience and some
empirical data (Grenyer, 2017; Sharp et al., 2015) strongly suggest that individuals differ not
only in terms of style or type (as, for example, described in the DSM or ICD Personality
Disorders section), but also in terms of level of personality organization: healthy, neurotic,
borderline, or psychotic; i.e., what Kernberg (1984) has termed “level of severity.”

Consequently, PDM-2 seeks to describe both personality style and level. In the following
paragraph, we illustrate this position using obsessional personality to demonstrate the importance
of the concept of level of organization.
A psychologically healthy obsessional man has routines from which he does not like to
deviate. He tends to intellectualize and avoid most strong affects. But he has a satisfying life,
meaningful work, and warm relationships with others. A man with obsessional tendencies at the
neurotic level finds that rigidity and regimentation interfere with his finishing work or making
important decisions. His isolation of affect diminishes the vitality in his relationships. He has
some perspective on his emotional constriction and may seek therapy to address it. A man at the
borderline level of obsessional functioning comes for treatment for raw, overwhelming dysphoric
affect that hijacks his experience. Even though his extreme rigidity and problems with authority
have created severe difficulties in both work and relationship, he cannot reflect on them easily.
His deep feeling that his way is the only reasonable way to function makes him highly resistant
to treatments that seek to examine it. An obsessional man at the psychotic level is consumed by
his symptoms. Immersed in preoccupations that have destroyed both work and relationships, he
nonetheless feels terror when his beliefs are called into question. His concerns appear delusional
to others yet feel to him not only perfectly reasonable but essential for his survival.
Fifth, we construe personality styles not in terms of dimensional traits on which a person
is high or low, but in terms of themes or conflicts around which a person is consciously and
unconsciously organized. Over decades of practice, clinicians have learned that the compulsively
neat person tends also to have a mess somewhere, the withdrawing schizoid person often longs
for closeness; the highly sexualized histrionic person is often sexually inhibited; the paranoid
person may be naively trusting of certain individuals. Thus, it is more accurate to construe

personality differences in terms of the narcissistic theme of superiority versus inferiority, the
obsessive-compulsive theme of defiance versus submission, the schizoid theme of closeness
versus distance, the hysterical theme of conflict about sexuality, gender, and power, and so on.
Taking a Dynamic Approach
It is within this dynamic organization that the P Axis is best understood. Although we
constructed this section with an effort to avoid off-putting analytic jargon, it is in essence deeply
psychodynamic in its assumptions. Consistent with contemporary theories of psychopathology
and personality, the axis emphasizes organizing psychological principles or themes that play out
in different life domains, the psychological meaning of the person’s experience, and the
functional interrelatedness of psychological characteristics and processes. Thus, we do not
construe individuals as collections of nomothetic traits which can be measured on separate
dimensions.
Instead, we view the psychological characteristics by which an individual can be
described as related dynamically by central internal themes and conflicts. Thus, the PDM-2
departs from the dimensional trait theory of personality currently ascendant among academic
researchers in personality, which has its origins in factor analyses of items from self-report and
peer-report questionnaires—the signal example being the Five Factor model (e.g., Costa &
McCrae, 1985). In contrast, a dynamic understanding retains the view that within an individual,
multiple motives compete for expression and vary depending on context, conflict, and anxiety.
Thus, an individual with a narcissistic style is neither high nor low on the trait of “self-esteem.”
Rather, it is the dynamic tension between coexisting feelings of superiority and of inadequacy
that defines the narcissistic dilemma, with expressions of superiority serving to counteract
painful feelings of inadequacy.

Similarly, the PDM-2 P Axis has some commonalities with other deterministic theories,
such as the cognitive information processing model which emphasizes the powerful stamp of
worldviews and belief systems (schemas) on a person’s appraisal of events. Thus, an obsessional
man sees the world in terms of dangers that would be unleashed by a lack of order and certainty.
A dynamic theory extends this understanding to show how this individual is better understood in
terms of a tension between submission to orderly norms and constraints, versus desires to rebel
and defy (with the former linked to underlying feelings of humiliation and rage, and the latter to
guilt and shame). Indeed, ongoing controversies between cognitive and dynamic models may be
best understood in terms of the latter’s appreciation of complexity, especially the psychoanalytic
premise that opposite and conflicting tendencies can be found in everyone.
The PDM-2 thus differs from both the dimensional trait theories that currently dominate
academic psychology (which influenced the “alternative” model for personality disorders in
section III of DSM-5), and from the cognitive and schema-based theories of personality that
emphasize cognitive beliefs. Both traits and cognitive schemas can be conceptualized within the
PDM-2. Consider, for example, the schizoid person’s aversion to attachment and dependency, or
the paranoid person's core belief that "I am in constant danger." These can certainly be viewed in
terms of cognitive schemas. But the PDM-2 goes beyond such constructs in that it alerts
therapists to underlying and harder-to-reach psychological concerns, such as the schizoid
person’s wish for closeness and the paranoid person’s need to defend against overwhelming
aggression.
The DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for each of the personality disorders tend to note traits that
are at one pole of a conflict rather than noting that either pole may be expressive of the same
underlying theme. For example, the DSM diagnosis of Narcissistic Personality Disorder

describes the grandiose or arrogant version of narcissistic psychology, which tends to dominate
when a narcissistic person’s self-esteem is inflated and defenses are serving their protective
functions. But it omits the depressed-depleted version of the same psychology, in which
grandiose defenses fail and self-esteem is painfully deflated (for a history of the grandiose and
vulnerable subtypes of narcissism, see Grenyer, 2013). It is truer to clinical experience to
characterize narcissistic psychology according to the encompassing theme of ongoing craving for
attention and affirmation, with different manifestations depending on the extent to which such
“narcissistic supplies” are forthcoming.
Changes from PDM-1 to PDM-2
In the PDM-2, we tried to improve on PDM-1 while retaining its focus on the personality
patterns and internal experience of individuals seeking treatment. Below, we summarize some of
the significant modifications from the first to the second edition.
Conceptualization of “Borderline” Syndromes
The first edition of the PDM followed Kernberg’s notion that borderline personality
“organization” represents the large super-cluster of personality pathology that subsumes most of
the personality disorders included in the DSM. But because clinicians and researchers continue
to refer to the specific personality style described in the DSM as borderline personality
“disorder,” its absence from the PDM-1 was confusing to therapists and perhaps unnecessarily
complex for researchers unfamiliar with the psychoanalytic concept of levels of personality
organization. In PDM-2, although we retained the original conception of borderline
“organization" as a super-cluster, we also added the more specific and narrowly identified
"borderline personality" descriptor.

The new borderline personality syndrome included in PDM-2 allows clinicians to rethink the traditional DSM diagnostic criteria using more dynamic thinking that better captures its
psychological complexity. Thus, we note the tensions between identity integrity and diffusion in
the "self-cohesion versus fragmentation" domain, and acknowledge the intense affect storms that
necessarily result when contradictory feeling states remain compartmentalized and therefore
cannot modulate one another. In addition, we highlight the sense of emptiness and unreality often
expressed by people with severe versions of the disorder via the pathogenic belief descriptor "I
don't know who I am” (in psychoanalytic terminology, the person may be said to inhabit
dissociated self-states rather than having a sense of continuity, or to have split and unintegrated
self and object representations). These descriptors help readers make useful links to some core
techniques of evidence-based therapies for borderline personality, such as a focus on reconciling
and integrating parts of the self that seem contradictory. They assist, for example, in
conceptualizing and treating the borderline man who considers himself loving toward important
others, whose love turns abruptly to rage when they disappoint him.
Addition of a Psychotic Level of Organization
Another important conceptual change from PDM-1 to PDM-2 is the addition of the
psychotic level of personality organization. This modification allows greater attention to the
severity of psychopathology seen at the lowest levels of personality functioning. Stern’s (1938)
original observations of a group of patients at the "border line” between neurosis and psychosis,
which ushered in decades of theorizing, reminds us of the need to focus on psychotic parts of
personality functioning even in patients without diagnosable psychotic disorders such as
schizophrenia. In Kernberg's (1984) model, the psychotic level is distinguished from the
borderline and neurotic levels by deficits in reality testing. Here we would locate the man with a

fixed belief that his body is permeated with the smell of rotting meat, or the anorexic teenage girl
who believes she is overweight, despite being on the verge of starving to death.
Conceptualizing these more severely disturbed patients as organized at a psychotic level
permits attention to needed modifications of psychotherapy technique. In general, the more
fragile, primitive, and paranoid the patient, the more the therapist needs to focus on safety. We
know from long clinical experience that therapists who are active, conversational, egalitarian,
and respectful, while also embodying knowledge and structure, reduce a patient’s need for
psychotic defenses. A respectful attitude avoids the humiliation that complicates the emotional
life of severely troubled patients and burdens their attitude toward their mental health problems.
Similar to clinicians working therapeutically with categorical psychotic disorders such as
schizophrenia, therapists working in the psychotic area of any patient’s psychology should thus
aim to bolster ego strengths and to recognize the psychological context in which the patient’s
psychotic anxieties become understandable (Garrett & Turkington, 2011).
Readers may be interested to know that among members of the Personality Task Force
that created the P Axis for PDM-1, there were differences of opinion about whether to include a
psychotic level of personality organization. Interestingly, this was one of the few areas in which
committee members had a significant substantive disagreement. Some argued, on the basis of
clinical experience, for the inclusion of a psychotic level, while others felt the term “psychotic”
had become so associated with specific disorders (especially schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorders, and psychotic versions of bipolar illness) that readers would find the term confusing
when applied to the domain of personality. Our resolution of this conflict at that time was to
describe personality as existing on a spectrum in which the borderline part of that range extended
"to the border of psychotic conditions" (PDM Task Force, 2006, p. 21).

In 2006, we could not locate empirical investigations of the utility to clinicians of
thinking in terms of a psychotic level of personality functioning. We thus could not turn to the
research literature to resolve the issue, and we consequently decided to err in the conservative
direction of not introducing a possibly confusing construct. But since then, colleagues have
conducted studies (e.g. Gordon, 2009; Gordon & Bornstein, 2017) demonstrating that for
practicing therapists – and not exclusively psychoanalytic therapists, as samples included
clinicians of all major theoretical orientations – the idea of some patients being organized at a
psychotic level is highly resonant and clinically useful. With this additional information, we
made the conceptual change in the 2017 edition.
Organization via Internalizing and Externalizing Spectra
Another innovation in the personality chapters is the introduction of the concepts of
"internalizing" and "externalizing" spectra. In the new edition, based on the recurrent appearance
of the concepts of internalizing and externalizing pathology in both clinical and empirical
writing, we ordered the personality styles in conformance with these superordinate themes.
People with internalizing personality pathology are prone to self-criticism and self-blame, as
found commonly in depressive, dependent, anxious-avoidant and phobic, obsessive-compulsive,
somatizing, and schizoid personalities. In contrast, people with externalizing pathology are prone
to blaming others, directing anger, aggression, and criticism toward other people, as found
commonly in narcissistic, histrionic, paranoid, psychopathic, and sadistic personalities.
Some Controversies
There are many issues reflected within the PDM-2 about which scholars differ and on
which more work needs to be done. There were several areas, for example, in which we were not
sure whether to conceptualize a given process as a personality style in its own right, or as a

personality trait or process observable across multiple personality styles. Although the following
list is not comprehensive, it should give a sense of our general struggle to organize, for clinical
purposes and with scholarly support, the confusing arrays of individual uniqueness that can be
conceptualized as personality levels and styles.
Depressive Personality Patterns
The PDM-2 follows the first edition of the PDM in including a depressive personality
style or type. Ever since the 1980 revisions of the DSM (DSM-III), such diagnoses have not
appeared in its Personality Disorders section. This omission results from an explicit decision by
the DSM-III editors in 1980 to eliminate Depressive Personality Disorder as a personality
diagnosis. The framers of the DSM-III sought to create a classification of psychiatric disorders
based exclusively on manifest, or readily observable, signs and symptoms. Personality was an
afterthought (R. Spitzer, personal communication to Jonathan Shedler). Whether by coincidence
or design, conceptualizing depressive phenomena solely in terms of “mood disorder” also
dovetailed with the interests of pharmaceutical companies, and most contributors to the Mood
Disorders section of the DSM have had financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry.
Nevertheless, there is strong clinical and empirical support for the concept of a depressive
personality style and disorder. Empirical studies show that it is the most common personality
syndrome encountered in psychotherapy practice (Westen & Shedler, 1999; Westen, Shedler,
Bradley, & DeFife, 2012), a finding that dovetails with the experience of clinical practitioners. It
also appears to be the most common personality style among therapists themselves (Hyde, 2009).
Despite the tendency to suffer depressive episodes, it is possible to have a depressive personality
style without suffering serious clinical depression. Depressive personality style describes
individuals who are self-critical and self-punitive, inclined toward feeling of inadequacy, guilt,

and shame, and organized around themes of loss. In response to life’s inevitable hardships and
losses, individuals with depressive style believe, consciously or unconsciously, that they are to
blame.
In PDM-2, we again drew upon Blatt’s (2008) observations about two subtypes of
depressive experience, which he termed introjective and anaclitic. People with the more
introjective version of a depressive personality style tend toward self-attack and associated
feelings of guilt; those with the more introjective version are highly reactive to separation, loss,
and associated feelings of shame. When alone, they may fee bereft and empty.
Masochistic (Self-Defeating) Patterns
Masochistic or self-defeating personality dynamics have often been construed as variants
of depressive personality, an assumption with some empirical support (e.g., Huprich, 2014).
Masochistic patterns resemble depressive ones, but masochistic individuals seem highly invested
in their own suffering, as if suffering had some great value that must not be relinquished. The
masochistic individual appears to have learned that inflicting suffering on oneself, or tolerating
mistreatment from others, is the best route to some valued goal (e.g., keeping a relationship,
achieving self-esteem, avoiding criticism). In PDM-1, we characterized self-defeating patterns as
constituting a separate personality syndrome, but in PDM-2, we instead offer a summary of
various conceptualizations that have been discussed in the clinical literature, and a brief
discussion of ways it is similar to, and different from, depressive personality per se.
We remain uncertain about how best to locate masochistic/self-defeating patterns.
Although masochism is widely understood as an unconscious investment in suffering, and has
sometimes been construed as a personality type itself—for example, in Millon’s (1996) system
or in the DSM-III-R provisional diagnosis of “Self-Defeating Personality Disorder—it can

appear in a wide range of other personality styles, including sadistic, dependent (Bornstein,
2005), narcissistic (Cooper, 1988), and paranoid (Nydes, 1963). In some cases it appears passiveaggressive, in some dependent, and in others it can be more self-preoccupied, as in the "moral
masochism" (Reik, 1941) of putting others’ needs first while ignoring or renouncing one’s own.
Because masochism appears as a process within a number of personality styles, it could possibly
be formulated as a psychological manifestation that cross-cuts a range of personality styles.
Passive-Aggressive Patterns
Both DSM-I and DSM-II described a “passive-aggressive personality” whose
characteristics were, not surprisingly, both passively dependent and provocatively hostile. At the
same time, passive aggression has been formulated as a consequence of developmental
exigencies in which direct expressions of hostility or antagonism – or even differences of opinion
– would be highly maladaptive (as in a family with an authoritarian parent who is punitive
toward argumentative children). Both editions of the PDM have conceptualized passiveaggressive patterns, as Millon (1996) did, as a possible subtype of a dependent personality style.
Schizotypal patterns
Broad-ranging controversy exists with respect to the schizotypal style: Is it best
understood as a personality syndrome or as a psychotic illness? DSM 5-includes it in both the
schizophrenia and personality disorder sections. ICD-9 had allowed it as a personality disorder
until September 2015, then moved it to the ICD-10 Schizophrenia section. The ICD-11 will
remove all psychotic and schizotypal features from the personality disorders classification
(Grenyer, 2017). Historically, schizotypal presentations were labeled "simple schizophrenia"
(impoverished affect, speech, and thought) and viewed as being on a psychotic spectrum.

PDM-2 reflects these controversies, conceptualizing schizotypy as both a personality trait
(P axis) and a symptom disorder (S axis). Within the P axis, schizotypal features are seen as one
possible aspect of schizoid personality, especially toward the psychotic end of the personality
continuum (cf. Westen, Shedler, & Bradley, 2012). Schizoid mechanisms are well described in
the psychoanalytic literature (Klein, 1946). Schizoid personality includes both schizotypal
impoverishments and the relational avoidance, sensitivities, or eccentricities that can be
burdensome to therapy but also an opportunity for treatment, if the therapist’s style is adapted to
respect these acute sensitivities and deficits (McWilliams, 2006). Thus, the troubled loner who is
acutely wary may, over time, come to tolerate limited connection to others without becoming
overwhelmed.
Hypomanic Patterns
Yet another controversy involves how to understand “hypomanic” phenomena. The issue
here is whether a persistent but relatively mild manic pattern that falls short of being diagnosable
as bipolar illness is better understood as a personality type or as a subclinical mood disorder. We
suspect that, rather than an either-or question, both phenomena exist, making diagnosis and
treatment challenging, both medically and psychologically. Medically, if a person’s hypomania
expresses an underlying mood disorder, a mood-stabilizing drug may be helpful. Some patients
with hypomanic patterns do report improvement from such medication, and perhaps that
responsiveness alone is adequate basis for inferring that a hypomanic pattern evidences a subclinical mood disorder. In other patients, such medications do not seem to help; their hypomanic
patterns may be less biologically driven.
Prior to DSM-III, hypomanic syndromes were conceptualized as personality disorders:
“hypomanic” in DSM-I and “cyclothymic” in DSM-II. Professional thinking at the time was that

denial and reaction formation (against underlying depressive affect) can be organizing
personality defenses that creates a stable or recurrent hypomanic state not indicative of a
biologically based mood disorder. More recently, consonant with the general trend in psychiatry
toward assumed biological etiologies, psychiatric bias in accounting for hypomanic patterns
favors construing them as sub-clinical mood disorders.
This issue has important clinical implications. Hypomanic presentations can be in the
service of avoiding situational depressive feelings, as in the behavior of some young people who
apply to countless universities in an effort to ward off anxieties that they will be accepted into
none. Such patients can be treated by interpretation of their defenses and exploration of the
feelings that the manic activity counteracts. Presumably, people with a hypomanic personality
style would benefit from a similar interpretive emphasis. In contrast, when a hypomanic
presentation expresses a bipolar illness, such interpretive interventions would accomplish little.
Pharmacological treatment is likely in order, and the therapist would be wise to shift the initial
focus of therapy from interpreting defenses to helping the person to avoid risky behaviors.
High-functioning people with hypomanic defenses rarely seek psychotherapy, and so we
have scant clinical experience with versions of the personality type that may be stable and
adaptive. Usually, individuals that therapists have construed as characterologically hypomanic
come to treatment when their defenses have failed and they have been overwhelmed, at least
briefly, with intense dysphoric affect. Because they have a tendency to bolt from treatment as
soon as their hypomanic adaptations are reestablished, they may be difficult to keep in therapy
long enough to help with their personality issues. It is thus critical for therapists to have some
psychodynamic understanding of the defenses involved and their function.

Our way of dealing with these complicated issues in PDM-2 was similar to our approach
in PDM-1. We retained the notion of a hypomanic style as expressing one version of the
operation of denial, i.e., as a persistent defense interwoven in stable dynamics that express
themselves in a pattern of personality notable for charm, quick wit, impulsivity, distractibility,
hypersexuality, and general sped-up-ness. At the same time, in other sections of the manual we
acknowledged hypomanic states as a part of both mild and serious mood disorders.
Anxious Patterns
Another area of debate concerns anxiety, again because it can have both symptom
features and longer-term personality characteristics. For example, there is disagreement as to
whether “generalized anxiety disorder,” typically a symptom on the S axis (as in DSM-5 and
ICD-10), can in many patients be better understood as a pervasive personality pattern affecting
most everyday activities. The PDM-2 has included anxiety in both sections and acknowledged
the variety of presentations in terms of severity and intention. The free-floating anxious
personality can range from psychotic levels of functioning that might include paranoid delusions
and annihilation fears, through to neurotic worries expressed in forms such as hysterical to
obsessional traits or moral preoccupations. Similarly, anxieties may be directed at avoidance of
specific objects or phobic worries about particular situations.
Anxiety has always had a special place in psychoanalysis. It was recognized early as
central to many forms of psychopathology, not only in its role as signaling threat and
symbolizing conflict, but also because of its triggering mental defenses to ward off or isolate
parts of the self from those threats and conflicts (Freud, 1926). There is good empirical data
showing how core anxiety preoccupations, including separation or abandonment fears, can

become an ongoing personality feature that requires deeper and longer psychotherapy processing
(Kirsten, Grenyer, Wagner, & Manicavasagar, 2008).
Concluding Comments
The move from the PDM-1 to PDM-2 has provided a timely opportunity to clarify our
thinking around how different manifestations of personality can be understood dynamically,
developmentally, dimensionally, by level of severity, and by the organization of underlying
conflictual themes. What sets the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual apart from the DSM and
ICD models is the effort to describe underlying psychological processes that give rise to manifest
symptoms and presenting problems. The PDM helps clinicians understand conflictual tensions
between underlying tendencies.
The PDM-2 attempts to help practitioners, especially newer clinicians, to make sense of
their patients’ personality styles and possible disorders. It provides a general exposure to the
psychoanalytic concept of levels of healthy, neurotic, borderline, and psychotic personality
structure, but it also can now more precisely assist in the understanding of individuals who fit
within a narrower definition of borderline personality disorder. The PDM-2 has expanded to
allow further description of the more psychotic aspects of personality and has called attention to
broader internalizing and externalizing spectra that emerge consistently in efforts to map both
personality and symptom syndromes. There remain a number of controversies that have not yet
been resolved by either research or clinical consensus. We hope that PDM-2 will inspire further
work that will shed more light on unresolved conceptual issues.
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